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Bromley, University of Wisconsin-Madison 'Dinar and Albiac have brought together an excellent set of papers using a game theoretic approach to analyse how policies affect the strategies of water users and managers around the world. This book will be valuable reading for seminars in economics, political science, sociology, policy and environmental science. Help Centre. My Wishlist Sign In Join.

Policy and Strategic Behaviour in Water Resource Management

Be the first to write a review. Sorry, the book that you are looking for is not available right now. Description Table of Contents Product Details Click on the cover image above to read some pages of this book! Industry Reviews 'Dinar and Albiac have produced a volume of enormous importance. List of Figures, Maps, Tables and Boxes p.

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All Rights Reserved. We consider standard assumptions on the aquifer and the economic rationality of farmers. First, we assume a single-cell unconfined aquifer characterized by a flat bottom and perpendicular sides, implying that the water table is the same at each point of the aquifer.

Policy and Strategic Behaviour in Water Resource Management by Ariel Dinar, Jose Albiac -

It declines with the aggregate rate of extraction, and rises with a constant natural recharge, which may be reduced by the aggregate quantity of collected rainwater before a drop soaks into the soil. Second, groundwater and rainwater have different productive characteristics, meaning that they contribute differently to production processes.

Third, farmers are identical, i. Finally, we assume that, at each time, each farmer can observe the current state of the natural resource. In the first two cases, we claim that farmers adopt a specialized irrigation strategy.

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In the last case, they have a mixed irrigation strategy. We moreover distinguish symmetric from asymmetric equilibria, i.

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As soon as we observe at least two farmers using different irrigation strategies, we face an asymmetric equilibrium. The emergence of those strategies depends both on costs and qualitative considerations.

Should we subsidize alternative water sources?

More precisely, it depends on the comparison between the ratio of marginal costs and the relative marginal productivity of groundwater and rainwater. Impacts of a subsidy or a tax rebate on rainwater use. Water pricing policies are used in order to conserve more water in situ. We especially may want to subsidize rainwater use in order to save groundwater, and thus increase the level of the aquifer. Assuming a simple linear-quadratic specification of our general model with two farmers, we however show that water policies may have opposite effects on the level of the water table, depending on whether farmers exploit conjunctively both water sources or not.

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When rainwater harvesting is subsidized, the cost of production decreases. We observe an increase in rainwater use at the asymmetric equilibrium for specialized farmers one farmer uses groundwater only and the other one uses rainwater only. Farmers who use groundwater, even if the other farmers do not use rainwater, suffer from the increased negative impact due to higher abstraction rates of the potential recharge.

Consequently, groundwater extraction decreases. When farmers use both water sources, the subsidy generates a substitution effect from groundwater to rainwater use.

However, it also generates an income effect it is as if the recharge were larger. When the income effect offsets the substitution effect, farmers use less rainwater. Hence, when farmers are not specialized, the subsidy may decrease rainwater use. In analyzing the hydrological impact of a subsidy on rainwater use, the results show that the water table elevation decreases at the asymmetric equilibrium with specialized farmers.